ABSTRACT Satellite navigation spoofing has become a central issue of jamming technology research because of its serious threat and ability to conceal itself. Increasingly, targets are equipped with more robust GNSS/IMU systems and normalized innovation squared (NIS) is used to detect interference. Therefore, it is harder to implement covert trajectory spoofing on a GNSS/IMU system than a GNSS-only target. In practice, spoofing is needed to control unknown targets. Therefore, covert trajectory spoofing for GNSS/IMU targets is an important issue. Hence, using the information fusion of a GNSS/IMU system, the influence of spoofing on loosely coupled GNSS/IMU positioning is derived. To avoid ill-posed equations when introducing a measurement deviation, a Kalman gain matrix local regularization method is proposed to accurately determine the measurement deviation. To avoid triggering the NIS detection alarm, the range that enables the introduced measurement deviation to remain concealed is calculated. Then, a two-step trajectory guidance algorithm is proposed to quickly guide the target onto the spoofing trajectory. The simulation results show that the proposed trajectory spoofing algorithm can guide a loosely coupled GNSS/IMU target along a spoofing trajectory without triggering the NIS detection alarm. The proposed method can remain concealed and has good theoretical and practical application value.
I. INTRODUCTION
Satellite navigation spoofing technology has become a central issue of jamming technology research because of its serious threat and potential for concealment [1] . In 2011, Iran claimed to capture the US RQ-170 ''Sentinel'' drone. It was suspected that Iran spoofed the drone into deviating from its intended trajectory by sending a spoofing signal. Spirent showed that it could create a simple source of spoofing by configuring the power amplifier and transmit antenna on its GSS8000 unit [2] . In 2002, Warner and Johnston used a simple GPS signal simulator to deceive the GPS receiver of the cargo truck, demonstrating that civilian GPS receivers are vulnerable to simple spoofing attacks [3] . In 2012, Shephard et al. created a civilian GPS signal with a hardware cost of less than USD 1,000 to deceive an unmanned helicopter, which should have maintained a fixed altitude, to drop in height. This experiment received extensive attention from the federal government and media [4] .
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In response to spoofing interference techniques, some spoofing detection techniques have emerged. In 2012, Broumandan et al. proposed a method for detecting spoofing signals based on the signal-space relationship [5] and Kim et al. proposed a spoofing detection method based on signal arrival time [6] . In 2014, Ziedan proposed a spoofing detection technique based on map matching [7] , and in 2015, Bitner et al. proposed a spoofing detection method based on signal arrival angle [8] and Zhao et al. proposed a spoofing detection method based on carrier phase tracking spectrum analysis [9] . In 2016, Psiaki and Humphreys argued that it is necessary for a GPS receiver manufacturer to add anti-spoof measures to their products [10] . Spoofing detection technology only alerts the user to the presence of spoofing signals. To continue to use the services provided by satellite navigation, the spoofing signal must be suppressed. Existing methods for suppressing spoofing signals mainly include the following: residual signal analysis [11] , multi-antenna beamforming and nulling [12] , the receiver autonomous integrity monitoring (RAIM) [13] , maximum likelihood detection [14] , VOLUME 7, 2019 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4. 
and multi-tracking loop and adaptive filtering [15] . In fact, the normalized innovation squared (NIS) detection of a navigation system is a direct, effective, and feasible method of spoofing detection that has been applied in the navigation system of targets such as drones [16] . Increasingly, targets are equipped with more robust GNSS/IMU systems. In addition, navigation systems usually use NIS to detect interference; therefore, it is more difficult to covertly spoof the trajectory of a GNSS/IMU system than a GNSS-only target. Hence GNSS/IMU systems are less often targeted by spoofing. In practical applications, spoofing technology is needed to effectively control such unknown targets; therefore, it is of great value to study covert trajectory spoofing in a target equipped with GNSS/IMU. Moreover, these research results can be used to improve a target's antispoofing ability.
In GNSS/IMU systems, the IMU continuously uses GNSS measurement information to correct its own errors, so slow long-term spoofing interference may also cause GNSS/IMU systems to be spoofed. When the difference between the spoofed position, velocity, and time (PVT) and the real PVT is large, a user can easily detect spoofing using a comparison with other sensor measurements. Hence, the PVT result needs to be gradually biased to ensure that the variation is within the sensor's error range [17] . In 2016, a theoretical derivation and simulation demonstrated the influence of GNSS spoofing on the results of loosely coupled positioning, the theoretical derivation and simulation analysis proved that: 1) GPS spoofing has an effective jamming effect on the locating result of loose coupled integrated navigation; and 2) The bias in integrated navigation at the present moment is affected by the former bias and GPS spoofing bias at the present moment synchronously, but does not represent an actual situation, in which a target will simply adjust its motion trajectory after being spoofed [18] . In 2017, a trajectory fusion strategy proposed by Li and Wang was shown to avoid the NIS sequence detection of UAV navigation system, it is assumed that the spoofing device is equipped with a position tracker to obtain the position information of UAV in real time, and acceleration value of the broadcast GPS spoofing signal matches the real acceleration of UAV, but the influence of spoofing on GNSS/IMU positioning results is not analyzed [19] . In 2018, Li et al. proposed a device to spoof a UAV based on the fact that the UAV would be tempted to adjust its course over time [20] .
Considering the information fusion method employed in GNSS/IMU, first, the influence of spoofing on loosely coupled GNSS/IMU positioning is deduced. To avoid the frequently ill-conditioned equations that occur when introducing a measurement deviation, a Kalman gain matrix local regularization method accurately creates a measurement deviation. At the same time, to avoid alerting the NIS detection of the target's navigation system, the range that the introduced measurement deviation should satisfy is calculated, which strongly conceals the spoofing process; then, a two-step trajectory guidance algorithm is proposed to quickly induce the target to follow a spoofing trajectory.
II. ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF SPOOFING ON LOOSELY COUPLED GNSS/IMU A. LOOSELY COUPLED GNSS/IMU MODEL
A loosely coupled GNSS/IMU system uses the error equations of GNSS and IMU to create the system state equation. It uses the difference in the navigation information output by GNSS and IMU as the measured quantity, establishes the measurement equation, uses an optimal filter to fuse the data of both systems, and obtains the best possible estimation. Finally, the result, is fed back to the IMU to corrected it and achieve high-precision navigation [21] .
The measurement information used by a loosely coupled GNSS/IMU system consists of position and velocity. The difference between the position and velocity obtained by the GNSS and the position and velocity calculated by the IMU is used as the input of a Kalman filter, and the output is corrected using feedback. That is, the correction of the gyroscope and acceleration drift error is performed in IMU without relying on external information, the position and velocity information of Kalman filter output directly corrects the IMU position and velocity result [22] . The block diagram of the loosely coupled GNSS/IMU structure diagram is shown in Figure 1 .
The navigation parameter error is used to represent the state of filter. The error state vector is (1) , as shown at the top of this page, where δL, δλ, and δh indicate position error; δv x , δv y , and δv z indicate speed error; ϕ x , ϕ y , and ϕ z indicate attitude angle error; ε bx , ε by , and ε bz represent the acceleration zero offset error; and ∇ bx , ∇ by , and ∇ bz represent the gyroscope drift error.
The loosely coupled mode takes the differences between the GNSS and IMU positions and speeds as measurement information. Hence, it does not need to increase the GNSS state variable in the system. Therefore, the loosely coupled state equation isẊ
where is the state transition matrix, G is the noise transfer matrix, and W is the system noise vector. The measurement equation is established as follows:
and the measurement of the quantity is represented as follows: Finally, the Kalman filtering process of the GNSS/IMU system can be expressed as follows:
whereX k represents IMU navigation parameter error estimate, k,k−1 represents the system state transition matrix from time k − 1 to time k, K k represents the filter gain matrix, Z k represents the system measurement value for time k, H k represents the measurement matrix for time k, P k|k−1 represents the one-step prediction error covariance matrix, P k represents the error covariance matrix, Q k−1 represents the noise variance matrix, and R k represents the measurement noise variance matrix.
B. ANALYSIS OF THE INFLUENCE OF MEASUREMENT DEVIATION ON GNSS/IMU
An analysis of GNSS/IMU systems shows that satellite navigation spoofing technology can be used to deceive them. The generated GNSS spoofing signal first affects the positioning result of the GNSS, then affects the measurement value of the Kalman filter, and is finally passed to navigation parameter error estimated by the Kalman filter.
It is assumed that the GNSS/IMU is in a normal working state before moment i, which is the time at which the GNSS/IMU is interfered with by GNSS spoofing so that the measurement value of system at time i is Z i . Here, Z i is actually composed of the true measurement value at time i and the deviation i of measurement value. That is,
The relationship between the measurement value deviation and GNSS spoofing deviation is as follows:
where R M is the radius of curvature of each point on the meridian circle of the Earth reference ellipsoid; R N is the radius of curvature of each point on the circle of the Earth reference ellipsoid; and L, λ, and h represent the latitude, longitude, and altitude, respectively.
If the influence of the GNSS spoofing on gain matrix K i is ignored in the Kalman filtering process, the GNSS/IMU error estimate under GNSS spoofing can be obtained as follows:
Because the GNSS/IMU output consists of the IMU navigation parameters corrected by the error estimation, error estimation deviation is the system deviation of the GNSS/IMU.
III. TRAJECTORY SPOOFING ALGORITHM A. KALMAN GAIN MATRIX LOCAL REGULARIZATION METHOD
The method for determining the deviation i of the measurement value is described below. Because the spoofer is assumed to be able to obtain the real position and velocity information of target by other means of detection, (8), and deviation i is measured by state error estimation deviation X i . Because spoofing only requires changing the target's position estimation, state error estimate deviation X i usually only contains three position estimation error deviations, and the remaining state estimation error deviation is zero. However, because the Kalman filter gain matrix K k often becomes ill-posed, this has obvious adverse effects on the solution, and the observability of other state parameters becomes worse than those of the positional parameters; However, because the Kalman filter gain matrix K k often becomes ill-posed [23] , this has obvious adverse effects on the solution, and the observability of other state parameters becomes worse than those of the positional parameters; The degree of linearization of the K k matrix is so serious that the i solved by Equation X i = K i i is obviously unreasonable, that is, a reasonable solution cannot always be obtained. It can proved by calculation that the least-square method, singular value decomposition, and generalized inverse method and other methods are used to calculate i from X i = K i i , and the result i is almost unavailable [24] .
To address the problem that i is difficult to solve, a Kalman gain matrix local regularization method is proposed to solve i . The method is as follows: First, the 15 × 3 dimensional Kalman filter gain matrix K i is divided into
where K a is a 3 × 3 matrix corresponding to the positional parameters and K b is a 12 × 3 matrix. Then, a compact singular value decomposition is performed on K a to obtain matrices U , S, and V so that
where S is a diagonal 3 × 3 matrix, such that the elements on the diagonal are singular values, U and V are respectively 3 × 3 dimensional unitary matrices, and V is the transpose of V . Tikhonov regularization is then solved for Eq. (8) . The regularization solution iλ should satisfy
where α is a regularization parameter, i is deviation at time i, i0 is the initial value of parameter i , and the initial value i0 of parameter i to be solved is determined by a linear least-squares method with non-negative constraints. Then, the L-curve method is used to determine the regularization parameters. The basic feature of the L-curve is that the regularization parameter corresponding to the L-curve inflection point is the optimized regularization parameter [25] , as shown in Figure 2 .
K a is a 3 × 3 matrix corresponding to the positional parameters, and K a is divided from the 15 × 3 dimensional Kalman 
The results are solved by the Kalman gain matrix local regularization method, as shown in Table 1 . This example shows that the Kalman gain matrix local regularization method can accurately solve i .
B. DETECTION BY NIS
Assume that target navigation system uses NIS as a detection means. When the NIS is greater than a set threshold, the target determines that the navigation system is being interfered with and trips an alarm. In this case, and spoofing interference fails [19] . The NIS is defined as follows:
where Z (k) is the measurement vector at time k, H (k) is the measurement matrix at time k,X k/k−1 (k) is the one-step prediction of X k calculated byX k−1 , S(k) is the prediction error covariance matrix, Z (k) − HX k/k−1 (k) is measurement innovation vector, S(k) represents the covariance of the innovation, and is the sum of the error covariance of the noise estimate and the state estimate of the state transition to the measurement space, which is
where R is measurement noise variance matrix. The NIS(k) function obeys the χ 2 distribution with m degrees of freedom, which is NIS(k) ∼ χ 2 (m), where m is the dimension of measurement vector Z (k), and the warning criterion is
where T In is the preset NIS alarm threshold, which can be determined according to a χ 2 distribution table.
To conceal the spoofing well, NIS(k) < T In should be satisfied. The following determines the range of measurement deviation based on NIS threshold. To satisfy NIS(k) < T In , we let Z (k) − HX k/k−1 (k) be x Z and perform a compact singular value decomposition on matrix S(k) −1 . Because S(k) −1 is a real symmetric matrix, matrices Q and can be obtained using where is a diagonal matrix of 3 × 3 dimensions and the elements on diagonal are singular values. Further, Q is a 3 × 3 dimensional unitary matrix, and Q is the transpose of Q. Then, NIS(k) < T In can be expressed as follows:
Let y Z = √ · Q · x and y Z be a three-dimensional vector:
. Then, equation (17) can be expressed as follows:
Therefore, the spatial region satisfying y Z of formula (16) can be represented as the inner region of the sphere in Figure 3 , where y Z is indicated by the black threedimensional vector.
C. TWO-STEP TRAJECTORY GUIDANCE ALGORITHM
In the spoofing scenario, the spoofer should broadcast the GNSS spoofing signal to the target after designing the spoofing trajectory based on the real-time location and speed of the target.
For ease of analysis, it is assumed that the target moves from the current position to the target point on the next predetermined trajectory in a fixed direction under the guidance of its navigation system. If there is no predetermined trajectory, usually the spoofing device configures the position tracker [26] (using lidar or photovoltaic tracker) to track the target (such as UAV), so spoofer can obtain position and velocity information of target in real time, therefore, within a very short time interval in which position tracker acquires position and velocity information of target, the motion path of target can be considered to be predicted because the time interval is extremely short, so the algorithm proposed in this paper can still be used, as it is assumed that the target moves from the current position to the target point on the VOLUME 7, 2019 FIGURE 6. Second step of the proposed spoofing method.
next predetermined trajectory in a fixed direction under the guidance of its navigation system. Therefore, the algorithm also has considerable practical application value. In practical applications, the target generally uses a GNSS/IMU output positioning result as its real position as it moves. When target navigation system determines the positioning offset with respect to its predetermined trajectory, it will adjust its heading to return the position to a point on the predetermined trajectory [20] . Using this feature of the target, the following basic spoofing methods are developed.
As shown in Figure 4 , it is assumed that the real position A of the target is known (obtained by some means of detection), point B is the target position of the target, line AB indicates original motion trajectory, C is a point on the spoofing trajectory, and D is the output point that spoofer makes the navigation system show, that is, the spoofing point. In the case of successful spoofing, the target believes that it moves according to trajectory DB, but in fact, the target moves along trajectory AC, and spoofing is successful.
Here, the proposed two-step trajectory guidance algorithm process is described in detail.
In the first step, the target is spoofed from predetermined trajectory x to spoofing trajectory x s . Suppose that at time i, the target is moving toward point a 1 according to the predetermined trajectory. Further suppose that point c 1 is a certain point on the spoofing trajectory, let − − → a 1 c 1 = [ X ac Y ac Z ac ] be the spatial vector from point a 1 to point c 1 , and point b 1 be the target point for the next GNSS correction on the predetermined trajectory. Figure 5 .
Therefore, − − → a 1 d 1 can be obtained as follows:
The measurement deviation ad to be introduced from point a 1 to point d 1 can be determined by the Kalman gain matrix local regularization using equation (8) . If the preset spoofing point c 1 is not reached, the first step is repeated until the target reaches preset spoofing point c 1 .
In the second step, the target, which has passed a certain point on x s continues to move along x s . It is assumed that the target at time i runs on spoofing trajectory point a 2 , the target navigation system says that the target is located at point e 2 of predetermined trajectory, b 2 is the target point of the GNSS at the next correction on spoofing trajectory, d 2 is the target point of the GNSS participating in the correction if the target moves in the direction of predetermined trajectory, and point 
The measurement deviation ec to be introduced from point e 2 to point c 2 can be determined by the Kalman gain matrix local regularization of Eq. (8) . If the spoofing point is not reached, the first step is repeated until the target reaches spoofing point b 2 .
The overall flow chart of the trajectory spoofing algorithm is shown in Figure 7 .
IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
The following spoofing scenario shows that target is exposed to spoofing attack in running, it is a more common spoofing scenario [27] .
In the first 30s, the target is not spoofed and keeps normal movement, after 30s, the predetermined trajectory and spoofing trajectory used for the evaluation are uniform motion trajectories with a duration of 50 s. Their starting point is the VOLUME 7, 2019 same, and the angle between the two trajectories is 20 • . At the starting point, the initial pitch angle of the predetermined trajectory is 45 • , the roll angle is 0 • , and the heading angle is 0 • ; the initial pitch angle of spoofing trajectory is 45 • , the roll angle is 0 • , and the heading angle is 20 • . For the sake of analysis, the time when target is spoofed is set to 0s.
The specific experimental parameters were set as follows. The GNSS sampling interval is 1 s, IMU sampling interval is 0.01 s, IMU gyro constant bias is 0.03 deg·h −1 , accelerometer constant bias is 100 µg, angular random walk is 0.001 deg·h −1/2 , velocity random walk is 5 µg·Hz −1/2 , pitch angle alignment error is 30 , roll angle alignment error is −30 , heading angle alignment error is 20 , velocity error is 0.1 m·s −1 , latitude position error is 1, longitude position error is 1, and height position error is 3. According to the χ 2 distribution table, the confidence interval of 99% (α = 0.01) with three degrees of freedom is [0, 11.34], so the NIS detection threshold is set to 11.34.
The overall and local motion trajectories of the motion in this evaluation are shown in Figure 8 . The blue and green lines respectively represent predetermined and spoofing trajectories, the red line represents navigation result output by target navigation system, and the black line represents the real motion trajectory of the target.
The Figure 8 (a) shows that after the target is spoofed by the GNSS, the navigation system output positioning result is affected. Therefore, the target continues to correct the motion direction according to positioning result output by the navigation system, so the system's navigation result is a oscillating line, but the navigation system still shows that the target is basically moving along a predetermined trajectory, as shown in Figure 8(b) . In fact, target has gradually moved from the predetermined trajectory to the spoofing trajectory, and finally moves stably along spoofing trajectory, as shown in Figure 8 (c) of the local motion trajectory.
The NIS distribution map of the target navigation system is shown in Figure 9 . Figure 9 shows that the NIS of the target navigation system increases continuously from 0 to 15 s, and finally stabilizes at a value of about 4. According to the statistical results in Table 2 , the maximum value of NIS is 4.073, which does not exceed the threshold of 11.34 and does not trigger the system alarm. This shows that the designed algorithm is concealed well.
The position, velocity, and attitude angle errors of the target's real and spoofing trajectories change with time, as shown in Figure 10 . Figure 10 shows that from 0 to 5 s, the target is affected by GNSS spoofing and gradually moves closer to the spoofing trajectory. At this time, the error in attitude angle between the real and spoofing trajectories fluctuates greatly. As shown in Figure 10 (a), the error of the eastward attitude angle reaches 4279, and the northward attitude angle error reaches 1966. In addition, the attitude error of the azimuth angle is at least −564.2, as shown in Figure 10 The mean-squared error of the Kalman filter result of the navigation parameters output by the target navigation system changes over time, as shown in Figure 11 . Figure 11 shows that when the target is affected by GNSS spoofing, the mean-squared errors of the Kalman filter results are relatively stable. The eastward attitude angle error is stable at 30 , and the northward attitude angle error is stable at 30 , as shown in Figure 11(a) . Moreover, the attitude error of the azimuth is stable at 20 , as shown in Figure 11(b) . The eastward, northward, and eastward errors are stable at 0.09965 m/s, 0.09976 m/s, and 0.09998 m/s, respectively, as shown in Figure 11(c) . Finally, the latitude, longitude, and height errors are stable at 0.7089 m, 0.7097 m, and 2.122 m, respectively, as shown in Figure 11(d) . These results demonstrate that, during the process of GNSS spoofing, the Kalman filter output from the target navigation system is stable and there is no abnormality, which means that the alarm of the navigation system is unlikely to be triggered.
The following experiments show more complex spoofing trajectories and actual effects under real conditions.
It is difficult to implement the actual test. First of all, in outdoor experiment, if spoofing experiment is not reported to the relevant radio management department, it is illegal for the spoofing device to broadcast spoofing signal to the air, in addition, spoofing device needs to obtain precise position of target in real time to achieve closed-loop spoofing control of target. This will put a large operational burden on the position tracker of spoofing device (whether it is a laser radar or a photovoltaic tracker). Therefore, the more complicated spoofing trajectory and actual effect under real conditions are verified by highly simulating real environment. It is proved that the algorithm of this paper can implement spoofing behavior on target, which has considerable theoretical and practical application value.
Under actual conditions, the position tracker obtains an error in target position. Therefore, the position error of target obtained in the latitude, longitude and height directions of spoofer is 1m, 1m, and 3m, respectively.
The predetermined trajectory and spoofing trajectory used for the evaluation are uniform motion trajectories with a duration of 200s. Their starting point is the same, and the angle between the two trajectories is 20 • . At the starting point, the initial pitch angle of the predetermined trajectory is 45 • , the roll angle is 0 • , and the heading angle is 0 • ; the initial pitch angle of spoofing trajectory is 45 • , the roll angle is 0 • , and the heading angle is 20 • .
The specific experimental parameters were set as follows. The GNSS sampling interval is 1s, IMU sampling interval is 0.01s, IMU gyro constant bias is 0.03 deg ·h −1 , accelerometer constant bias is 100 µg, angular random walk is 0.001 deg ·h −1/2 , velocity random walk is 5 µg · Hz −1/2 , pitch angle alignment error is 30 , roll angle alignment error is −30 , heading angle alignment error is 20 , velocity error is 0.1 m · s −1 , latitude position error is 1m, longitude position error is 1m, and height position error is 3m. According to the χ 2 distribution table, the confidence interval of 99% (α = 0.01) with three degrees of freedom is [0, 11.34], so the NIS detection threshold is set to 11.34.
The overall and local motion trajectories of the motion in this evaluation are shown in Figure 12 . The blue and green lines respectively represent predetermined and spoofing trajectories, the red line represents navigation result output by target navigation system, and the black line represents the real motion trajectory of the target.
The Figure 12 (a) shows that after the target is spoofed by the GNSS, the navigation system output positioning result is affected. Therefore, the target continues to correct the motion direction according to positioning result output by the navigation system, so the system's navigation result is a oscillating line, which fluctuates due to the tracking error of the position tracker, but the navigation system still shows that the target is basically moving along a predetermined trajectory, as shown in Figure 12(b) . In fact, target has gradually moved from the predetermined trajectory to the spoofing trajectory, and finally moves stably along spoofing trajectory, as shown in Figure 12 (c) of the local motion trajectory.
The NIS distribution map of the target navigation system is shown in Figure 13 . Figure 13 shows that within 200s, the NIS of the target navigation system has about 180s less than the threshold of 11.34, up to 90% of the time, and according to the statistical results in Table 3 , the average value of NIS is 5.958, which does not exceed the threshold of 11.34 and does not trigger the system alarm. This shows that the designed algorithm is concealed well.
The position, velocity, and attitude angle errors of the target's real and spoofing trajectories change with time, as shown in Figure 14 . The mean-squared error of the Kalman filter result of the navigation parameters output by the target navigation system changes over time, as shown in Figure 15 . Figure 15 shows that when the target is affected by GNSS spoofing, the mean-squared errors of the Kalman filter results are relatively stable. The eastward attitude angle error is stable at 30 , and the northward attitude angle error is stable at 30 , as shown in Figure 15(a) . Moreover, the attitude error of the azimuth is stable at 20 , as shown in Figure 15(b) . The eastward, northward, and eastward errors are stable at 0.09965 m/s, 0.09976 m/s, and 0.09998 m/s, respectively, as shown in Figure 15(c) . Finally, the latitude, longitude, and height errors are stable at 0.7089 m, 0.7097 m, and 2.122 m, respectively, as shown in Figure 11(d) . These results demonstrate that, during the process of GNSS spoofing, the Kalman filter output from the target navigation system is stable and there is no abnormality, which means that the alarm of the navigation system is unlikely to be triggered.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, the influence of spoofing on loosely coupled GNSS/IMU positioning was derived. To solve the problem of ill-posed equations that occur when a measurement deviation is introduced, a Kalman gain matrix local regularization was used. To avoid triggering the NIS detection alarm of the target navigation system, the allowable range of the introduced measurement deviation was calculated, so that the spoofing can remain concealed. Then a two-step trajectory guidance algorithm was proposed that quickly induces the target to follow the spoofing trajectory. The simulation results show that the proposed trajectory spoofing algorithm can guide a loosely coupled GNSS/IMU target along a spoofing trajectory while avoiding tripping the NIS detection alarm. Moreover, the spoofing is concealed well. This study provides a complete and feasible scheme for implementing covert trajectory spoofing on a GNSS/IMU target. It also provides a technical reference for the effective control of unidentified targets such as drones using spoofing technology in actual scenarios.
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